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This paper shows that short debt maturities commit equityholders to leverage
reductions when refinancing expiring debt in low-profitability states. However,
shorter maturities lead to higher transaction costs since larger amounts of
expiring debt need to be refinanced. We show that this trade-off between higher
expected transaction costs against the commitment to reduce leverage in low-
profitability states motivates an optimal maturity structure of corporate debt.
Since firms with high costs of financial distress and risky cash flows benefit
most from committing to leverage reductions, they have a stronger motive to
issue short-term debt. Evidence supports the model’s predictions. (JEL G3,
G32)
Received XXXX XX, XXXX; editorial decision XXXX XX, XXXX by Editor
XXXXXXXXXXXX.
Significant progress has been made toward understanding firms’
dynamic financing decisions. Major contributions to this literature
model a firm’s assets or cash flows as a stochastic process and assume
that debt generates some benefit, such as a tax advantage, but also
generates dead weight costs associated with excessively high leverage,
such as bankruptcy costs.1 While these models have successfully
explained firms’ optimal target leverage ratios and their decisions to
dynamically increase debt levels in response to increases in their asset
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1 See, for example, Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), Leland (1994a), Leland and Toft
(1996), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Dangl and Zechner (2004), and Strebulaev
(2007).
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values or cash flows, they have much less successfully explained leverage
reductions. In fact, these models generally imply that equityholders
never find it optimal to use retained earnings or to issue equity to reduce
leverage. This is due to a version of Myers (1977) underinvestment
problem: equityholders “underinvest”in leverage reductions and do not
inject capital or reduce dividends to repurchase debt, since this would
transfer wealth to the remaining bondholders. As shown by Admati,
DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2018), equityholders not only lack
any incentive to actively repurchase outstanding debt but also frequently
have incentives to increase debt even if increasing their debt reduces
their firm’s total value. Thus, in these models, debt reductions only
occur following bankruptcy.2
This implication is in contrast to evidence that debt reductions
frequently occur even in the absence of bankruptcy or negotiated debt
forgiveness.3 In this paper, we develop a dynamic capital structure model
that features such voluntary leverage reductions induced by firms’ finite
debt maturities. The key insight is that equityholders of a firm with
perpetual debt do not find it optimal to repurchase debt to reduce
leverage, due to a version of the Myers (1977) underinvestment problem.
However, a firm that must repay some of its debt due to its finite
maturity may not want to issue new debt with the same face value,
when its profitability is low. Essentially, a firm with a higher fraction of
maturing debt (shorter maturity), has a greater flexibility to manage
its leverage in relatively bad states.4 Thus, we identify and analyze
a largely unexplored aspect of debt maturity, namely, its effect on
future capital structure dynamics. We specifically address the following
questions. How is debt maturity related to equityholders’ dynamic
leverage adjustments? How do firms optimally refinance expiring debt?
2 Leland and Hackbarth (2019) extend the analysis in Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and
Pfleiderer (2018) and analyze multiple rounds of debt issues when existing debt is senior
to new debt. They provide results on how maturity affects incentives for subsequent debt
issues. Other models consider debt renegotiations and derive partial debt forgiveness
outside of bankruptcy (see, e.g., Anderson and Sundaresan (1996); Mella-Barral and
Perraudin (1997); Mella-Barral (1999); Christensen, Flor, Lando, and Miltersen (2014)).
Mao and Tserlukevich (2015) present a model in which noncoordinated debt holders may
accept repurchase offers below the market price when firms pay with existing safe assets or
cash. Lehar (2018) considers multilateral bargaining and explicitly considers renegotiation
breakdowns and subsequent inefficient liquidation. In contrast to these papers, we focus
on situations in which coordination problems among bondholders prevent renegotiation
solutions.
3 Surveying 392 CFOs, Graham and Harvey (2001) report that 81% of firms in their
sample use target leverage ratios. If highly levered, firms tend to issue equity to
maintain their target ratios. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find strong evidence
that firms use (time-varying) target leverage ratios. They identify deviation from this
target as the dominant economic factor in determining whether a firm retires debt.
DeAngelo, Gonçalves, and Stulz (2018) report that firms deleverage regularly, but that
this deleveraging is typically small when compared to retained earnings or new equity
issues.
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What is the optimal debt maturity structure given its implications for
dynamic capital structure adjustments and which firms are most likely
to issue short-term debt? We analyze these questions in a framework in
which equityholders are allowed to optimize the mix of debt and equity
used to refinance maturing debt, but they cannot commit ex ante to
a particular refinancing mix. Firms can also increase the face value of
debt at any point in time, but, to do so, they first need to repurchase
the existing debt. This can be interpreted as eliminating debt covenants,
which prevent firms from diluting existing debtholders by issuing more
debt.
We find that firms’ equityholders may not wish to rollover maturing
debt by issuing a new bond with the same face value. Instead, it
may be optimal for them to issue a new bond with lower face value
and at least partly refinance expiring debt with equity. This happens
after a deterioration in the firm’s profitability and debt maturity is
sufficiently short. In this case new debt can only be issued at a high credit
spread, since the price of the new bonds reflects the increased default
probability and the resultant increase in expected costs of financial
distress. Equityholders and may therefore wish to only partially rollover
maturing debt.
If, by contrast, debt maturity is sufficiently long, then replacing
maturing debt with equity always leads to a significant wealth transfer
to the remaining bonds outstanding, since debt with a longer maturity
is subject to more credit risk. This makes the rollover decision subject
to a more severe debt overhang problem and makes the use of equity
to refinance maturing debt suboptimal for equityholders. We find that,
for sufficiently long debt maturities, firms always prefer to rollover debt
at the maximum rate, that is, to issue a new bond with a face value
that corresponds to the face value of the maturing bonds. This result
is in accordance with evidence reported by Hovakimian, Opler, and
Titman (2001) and Jungherr and Schott (2020b), who find that long
debt maturities majorly impede debt reductions.
We show that shorter debt maturities lead to more pronounced debt
reductions since they require the firm to refund a larger fraction of
its debt during any given period of time. Thus, ceteris paribus, the
shorter the maturity, the faster the debt face value declines in response
to deteriorating firm cash flows.
In accordance with Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2018)
and DeMarzo and He (2020), firms never wish to actively repurchase
nonexpiring debt. Instead, debt reduction is determined by the ex post
decision how to repay maturing debt. Short-term debt, therefore, can
be interpreted as an ex ante commitment to engage in debt reductions
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Equityholders’ incentives to refund maturing debt with equity are
nonmonotonic in the firm’s profitability and thus in firm value. For
values around the initial cash flow level it is optimal to fully rollover
maturing debt by issuing new bonds with the same face value. If
the firm’s profitability drops sufficiently, then equityholders reduce the
rollover rate, as explained above. However, if the firm’s cash flows
continue to deteriorate and the firm is pushed toward the default
boundary, equityholders eventually find it optimal again to choose
the maximum rollover rate. Since the firm is close to bankruptcy a
reduction in leverage largely benefits the remaining bondholders, even
if the maturity of the remaining debt is short. Thus, the resultant debt
overhang problem implies that equityholders are no longer willing to
contribute capital to reduce debt.
Our analysis is closely related to that of DeMarzo and He (2020), who
analyze capital structure dynamics in the absence of any commitment
or debt covenants. They show that in such a setting equityholders’
incentives to dilute existing bondholders lead to rollover and debt issuing
decisions that make the net present value of all future debt issues exactly
zero. As a result, relatively simple valuation expressions and a rich set of
results are obtained. The focus of our paper is very different. Whereas in
DeMarzo and He (2020) debt maturity is irrelevant and the value of the
optimally levered firm equals that of a firm that never issues any debt,
we focus precisely on the optimal maturity choice and the trade-offs
that motivate it. In doing so, we allow for two realistic features, namely,
transaction costs associated with debt rollover and a covenant that
protects existing bondholders from being diluted via leverage increasing
new pari passu issues. This generates an interior optimal debt maturity
and also results in a positive net benefit of leverage.
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) present strong empirical
support for this nonmonotonicity in voluntary debt reductions. Our
own empirical results, presented in this paper, confirm these findings
and also provide novel support for our theoretical results. Interestingly,
existing literature, such as Welch (2004), has interpreted the fact that
highly levered firms issue debt as evidence against the trade-off theory
of capital structure choice, since it moves the leverage ratio away from
the optimal target ratio. Our analysis demonstrates that this behavior
can be in full accordance with a dynamic trade-off paradigm once new
debt issues and rollover decisions are considered.
In our setting, debt maturity significantly influences the expected
probability of bankruptcy since short maturities lead to more rapid
debt reductions when the firm’s profitability starts to decrease. Investors
take this into account when they price the debt initially. This implies
that firms’ debt capacity generally increases as they choose shorter debt
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1994b; 1998; Leland and Toft 1996), which predicts that short-term debt
leads to early and inefficient default and therefore reduces debt capacity,
as measured by the firm’s initial target leverage.5
Our analysis therefore generates a novel theory of optimal debt
maturity where, for reasonable parameter values, total firm value is
maximized at an interior debt maturity. Firms hereby trade off an
increased flexibility in future leverage reductions induced by short-term
debt against the additional transaction costs incurred when refinancing
expiring debt.
We show that firm value has two local maxima when plotted against
its debt maturity. One local maximum is obtained when debt maturity
goes to infinity. This is the case since firms with debt maturities
beyond a critical threshold never engage in leverage reductions when
rolling over debt. Increasing maturity beyond this critical threshold
therefore no longer has any effect on leverage dynamics, but leads to
a reduction in transaction costs since a smaller fraction of debt must
be refinanced at any given period of time. Therefore, total firm value is
locally maximized for infinite-maturity debt. However, when shortening
debt maturity below the critical threshold, firms start to engage in
debt reductions when their profitability decreases, thereby reducing the
probability of financial distress. Over this maturity range, shortening
maturity increases debt capacity and total firm value starts to rise, until
the increase in transaction costs associated with refinancing maturing
debt outweigh the increased benefits due to faster debt reductions along
unfavorable cash flow paths. Thus, total firm value exhibits another
local maximum at an interior value of debt maturity. The exact location
of this maximum depends on the parameters of the firm’s cash flow
process, such as its growth rate and its volatility, as well as on the
transaction costs associated with rolling over debt and the magnitude
of bankruptcy costs. For empirically reasonable model parameterizations
we find that firm value is indeed maximized for interior debt maturities.
Infinite-maturity debt maximizes firm value globally only if the costs of
financial distress and/or the tax advantage of debt are very low and/or
transaction costs associated with rolling over debt are very high. In
this case the benefit from increasing debt capacity and reducing the
bankruptcy probability by committing to future leverage reductions via
short-term debt is too low compared to the additional transactions.
5 This result can be understood as follows. In bad states of the world, issuing a bond with
the same face value to refinance expiring debt leads to a funding gap, since the new bond
must be sold below face value. This funding gap increases with the fraction of debt that
must be rolled over. As a result, firms with short maturities default sooner, that is, at
more profitable states, since equityholders would have to cover this wider funding gap. In
contrast to these papers, we do not force firms to always keep constant the face value of
debt, and, thus, we capture the effect of short debt maturity on future leverage reductions.
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Existing evidence as well as our own empirical results accord well
with our theoretical predictions. When we double-sort firms by market
leverage and the fraction of short-term debt into quintiles, we find that
more highly levered firms subsequently delever more when a larger
fraction of their debt is short term. We also find evidence that the
incentive to reduce leverage is nonmonotonic, as predicted by the model.
Furthermore, our regression results imply that firms with high cash flow
volatilities and low bankruptcy costs prefer debt with shorter maturities,
in line with our model results.
Leland (1994b), Leland and Toft (1996), and Leland (1998) were the
first to analyze debt maturity in a dynamic trade-off setting. Titman and
Tsyplakov (2007) extended this literature by endogenizing investment
decisions. Their contributions have led to the development of important
modeling approaches allowing for the analysis of debt maturity in a
tractable continuous-time framework. These papers also provide insights
into the interplay between leverage and debt maturity. However, they
cannot explain interior optimal debt maturities since in all these models
it would be optimal to issue perpetual debt.
We extend the above literature along one crucial aspect: we allow
firms to choose how they refinance expiring debt, whereas firms in the
papers discussed above must always issue new bonds with a face value
that equals the face value of the expiring debt. Thus, the total face value
of debt remains constant. This paper differs from this literature, since it
focuses on the role debt maturity to mitigate conflicts of interest between
debtholders and equityholders that arise in the context of subsequent
capital structure adjustments and find that this may generate an interior
optimal debt maturity.6
The growing interest in the interaction between debt maturity and
leverage dynamics by corporate theorists has recently inspired several
papers related to our work. Benzoni, Garlappi, Goldstein, Hugonnier,
and Ying (2020) focus on the main result of DeMarzo and He (2020),
namely, that in the absence of any commitment or bond covenants,
agency problems imply that the present value of future tax benefits
of debt are perfectly offset by the present value of expected future
bankruptcy costs. They show that this result may not be robust once
one allows for fixed costs of debt issuance. Such costs lead to a more
6 Childs, Mauer, and Ott (2005) and Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005)
also explore debt maturity. However, in these models, firms only have a single bond
outstanding, and they can only change their debt levels after the entire existing debt has
matured. In our model, firms are allowed to change the debt level at any point in time. As
a result, we are able to isolate the commitment effect of debt maturity on equityholders’
willingness to adjust debt levels downward after a decrease in profitability. Furthermore,
firms in our model have many bonds with different maturities outstanding, as is frequently
the case in practice. At any point in time, firms retire only a fraction of all outstanding
bonds. Therefore, when some bonds mature and are refinanced with new debt or via equity,
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conservative debt strategy, which in fact reestablishes a net benefit
of debt, even without commitment. Benzoni, Garlappi, Goldstein,
Hugonnier, and Ying (2020) conclude that this result holds even in
the limit, as fixed issuance costs go to zero. Our model allows for debt
covenants, proportional costs of debt rollover, and fixed costs of discrete
debt restructurings. This setting motivates a net benefit of leverage and
generates insights into the trade-offs between debt maturity, rollover
costs, and the resultant leverage dynamics and into the ways firm
characteristics affect all three.
Geelen (2016) studies a firm that issues noncallable debt with a
single finite maturity. After having repaid the maturing debt, firms
implement a new, total firm value-maximizing capital structure. This
setting also captures some of the benefits of short-term debt that we
identify, since firms issue a lower amount of debt after having repaid
outstanding debt in a bad state of the world. As in our model, the
trade-off between the flexibility of finite maturity debt, which reduces
bankruptcy costs, on the one hand, and issuance costs on the other hand
motivates an optimal debt maturity. However, in Geelen (2016), leverage
adjustments cannot take place prior to the lumpy debt maturity, and
the model cannot account for the agency conflicts that lead to, what
we refer to as underinvestment in leverage reduction, which arises in
the presence of multiple debt maturity issues. As we will discuss in the
conclusion, extending our setting, where maturity structure is perfectly
granular, to allow for some lumpiness of maturities, while still allowing
for heterogeneous debt maturities, is an interesting avenue for future
research.
In a somewhat different vein, Chen, Xu, and Yang (2020) study debt
maturity over the business cycle and model optimal maturity choice
as a trade-off between higher liquidity discounts associated with long-
term debt and higher rollover costs associated with short-term debt. As
in Geelen (2016), debt maturity is lumpy, that is, perfectly correlated
across all units of outstanding debt. The authors are able to link
maturity choice to firms’ systematic risk and to the business cycle.
Our model does not generate predictions for the interaction between
systematic risk and maturity choice but reveals that the disadvantage
of long-term debt arises endogenously from agency conflicts.
Our paper is also related to debt maturity theories, which are driven
by informational asymmetries. As demonstrated by the seminal work
of Diamond (1991, 1993) and Flannery (1986, 1994), short-term debt
maturities signal positive inside information. Other authors, such as
Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), have
emphasized the disciplinary role of short-term debt. Debt maturity also
has been linked to the debt overhang or underinvestment problem.
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debt mitigates these problems, Diamond and He (2014) show that
maturing short-term debt can lead to more severe debt overhang than
nonmaturing long-term debt. Different from these papers, we analyze
a debt overhang problem that is not related to the asset side of the
corporate balance sheet, but instead to the liability side. Long-term debt
in our context leads equityholders to underinvest in leverage reductions.7
Gomes, Jermann, and Schmid (2016) emphasize the role of long-term
nominal corporate debt in the presence of unexpectedly low inflation
and the resultant debt overhang problem in a general equilibrium model.
They identify corporate long-term debt as an important channel that
transmits inflationary shocks into the real economy.
An interesting, related literature tackles the interaction between debt
maturity, rollover risk, and capital structure. Examples include He and
Xiong (2012a,b), He and Milbradt (2014), Cheng and Milbradt (2012),
and Chen, Cui, He, and Milbradt (2017). In a similar vein, He and
Xiong (2012a) and Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011) analyze debt
maturity when short-term debt can lead to early and inefficient asset
liquidation. Some papers, such as Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)
and He and Milbradt (2016), analyze debt maturity adjustments over
time, but in these papers the initial maturity is exogenous.
Finally, our paper is also related to an emerging literature that
analyzes rollover risk and the volatility of credit spreads and the optimal
dispersion of debt maturities (see Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner 2018;
Chaderina 2018). While credit spreads at future rollover dates are also
stochastic in our model and therefore affect optimal maturity choices,
we do not explicitly model the dispersion of debt maturities.8 None of
the contributions discussed above shares the focus of our paper, namely,
the effect of debt maturity on equityholders’ future incentives to delever.
1. The Model
We consider a firm with unlevered instantaneous free cash flow after






where dWt is the increment to a standard Wiener process. Table 1
summarizes the notation used throughout this paper.
7 Jungherr and Schott (2020a) analyze the effects of Myers’ underinvestment problem and
the incentive to dilute long-term debt via additional pari passu issues on maturity in a
dynamic framework.
8 In fact, the maturity dispersion in our model is characterized by a constant proportion of
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Let Bt denote the firm’s face value of debt outstanding at time t,
with fixed coupon rate i. Coupon payments are deductible from the
corporate tax base. In the spirit of Leland (1994b), Leland (1998), and
Ericsson (2000), a constant fraction m of the outstanding debt matures
at any instant of time. Ignoring default and debt repurchase, the average
maturity of a debt contract is then 1/m years.
Retired debt may be replaced with a new debt issue, but the face
value of the new bond may not exceed the face value of the retired
debt, mBt. Thus, the bond indenture ensures that the rate, δt, at which
the firm issues new debt satisfies δt≤m. The new debt issue generates
proportional transaction costs, ki, has the same priority as existing debt
and is amortized at the same constant rate m.
[Table 1 about here.]
If the firm wishes to increase its face value of debt, it must first
remove the existing debt covenants by repurchasing all outstanding debt.
The subsequent new bond issue is also associated with proportional
transaction costs, denoted by kr. The coupon rate of the new issue is
set so that the bond can be sold at par.
The important difference to existing models with finite average
maturity is that the firm is not forced to rollover the entire amount
of maturing debt. While firms in Leland (1994b), Leland (1998), and
Ericsson (2000) must always set the rollover rate δt=m, we allow the
firm to choose δ optimally. In some states of the world, the firm may find
it optimal to replace only part of the retired debt with new debt or it
might entirely abstain from issuing new debt contracts. If the firm does
not fully replace retired debt, then the face value of debt outstanding is
reduced at a rate m−δt, which, in turn, may help the firm avoid future
financial distress.
If the firm’s equityholders stop coupon and principal repayments and
thereby trigger bankruptcy, all control rights over the firm’s productive
assets are transferred to debtholders who will then optimally re-lever the
firm. As in Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), this transfer of control
rights is associated with bankruptcy costs, assumed to be a fraction g
of the outstanding face value of the firm’s debt.9
Our model captures two central features of many countries’ tax
systems. First, we assume that interest payments are deductible from
the corporate tax base while dividends are not.10 Second, we allow for
interest income to be taxed more heavily at the personal level than
equity income. To capture this feature in a parsimonious way, we assume
9 Alternatively, we could assume that bankruptcy costs are a proportion of the unlevered
assets in bankruptcy. This alternative assumption does not qualitatively change our
results.
10 We assume instant tax refunds for coupon payments and do not explicitly model any loss
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that equity income is not taxed at the personal level, whereas debt
income is taxed at rate τp. Therefore the appropriate discount rate for
expected after-corporate-tax income for equityholders under the risk-
neutral probability measure is given by r(1−τp), see Section 2. For a
discussion of the calibration of the tax parameters and how they relate
to the current U.S. tax code, we refer to Section 3.
Since the values of equity and debt will be shown to be linear
homogeneous in the face value of debt, we can redefine the state variable







where τp is the personal income tax rate on debt and µ̂ is the risk-neutral
drift rate of the cash flow ct.
Since firms can, at any point in time, either increase debt by a discrete
amount from Bt to B
∗
t or rollover maturing debt at a rate of δt≤m, the







−1 : debt is increased from Bt to B∗t
at time t,
−(m−δt)dt : firm replaces maturing debt at
a rate δt∈ [0,m] at time t,
B0 = B(0).
(3)







−1 : debt is increased from
Bt to B
∗
t at time t,
(µ̂+(m−δt))dt+σdWt : maturing debt is replaced








(For a derivation of the dynamics, see Appendix A.1.)
Thus, a discrete adjustment of the debt level following a debt
repurchase leads to an immediate jump in the inverse leverage ratio.
Alternatively, if the face value of debt is maintained at a constant
level (i.e., δt=m), then the inverse leverage ratio follows a geometric
Brownian motion with the same drift rate and volatility as the original
cash flow process for ct. When only part of the maturing debt is
rolled over (δt<m), then the drift rate of the inverse leverage ratio
is µ̂+(m−δt)>µ̂, that is, because of the shrinking debt level, the firm’s
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2. Claim Valuation and Optimal Capital Structure Strategies
In this section we derive the valuation equations for the firm’s debt and
equity, given the state variables B and y, as well as propositions for
the optimal refinancing mix for maturing debt. Consider first the value
of equity, Et. Equityholders have a claim on the firm’s after corporate
tax cash flow, ct, reduced by the required payments to debtholders,
that is, after-tax coupon payments, (1−τc)iBt plus principal repayment,
mBt. The cash flow to equityholders also includes the proceeds from
(partially) rolling over maturing debt, (1−ki)δtDt, where ki represents
the proportional transaction costs associated with the new debt issue, δt
is the rate at which debt is rolled over and Dt denotes its market value.
When the resultant dividends to equityholders become negative, they
can be interpreted as seasoned equity issues.11 Equityholders default
when it is optimal for them to do so by stopping coupon and principal
payments. At the resultant random default time, TD, the equity claim
becomes worthless.
When the firm decides to increase the face value of debt at time
TK , it must repurchase its outstanding debt at a price (1+λ)BTK .
Following such a call, equityholders hold a claim to the value of the
firm, VK , endogenously determined later, which anticipates optimal re-
levering. For a given contingent strategy on rollover, recapitalization,

























where 1{.} is the indicator function, which equals one if the expression
in brackets is true and zero otherwise.
Next, we derive the valuation equation for the debt claim. Debtholders
receive an after-tax coupon flow of i(1−τp)Bt and a flow of principal
11 We do not consider equity issuance costs since this would considerably complicate the
analysis but would not qualitatively alter the main drivers of our results. Short-term debt
would still reduce agency conflicts in bad states, but the net benefits are likely to be
smaller. This is consistent with Chen, Xu, and Yang (2020), who model bondholders’
liquidity preferences over the business cycle and find that in their model higher equity
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repayment mBt. Depending on the firm’s choice of the rollover rate
δt, debtholders buy the new issues at market value Dt, resulting in a
cash flow of −δtDt as well as a change of the firm’s debt level at a
rate −(m−δt). Debtholders receive this cash flow until either the firm
defaults at random time TD or the entire debt is called at a random
time, TK . At default, debtholders receive the value DD, equal to the
value of the firm’s re-levered productive assets net of bankruptcy costs,
which will be determined later. When debt is called, debtholders receive
(1+λ)BTK .
Anticipating the firm’s future decisions about rollovers, recapitaliza-
tion, and bankruptcy, debtholders price the firm’s debt as the expected



















+1{TK≤TD} (1+λ)BTK︸ ︷︷ ︸




2.1 Equityholders’ Optimal Capital Structure Strategy
In this subsection we derive a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium capital
structure strategy where investors price debt based on rational beliefs
about the firm’s debt rollover, default and recapitalization decisions
and, given these prices, firms have no incentive to deviate from the
conjectured capital structure strategy. There is no precommitment,
except that firms must repurchase the existing debt (i.e., eliminate a
debt covenant) before they can issue new debt with a higher face value.
Anticipating that debt and equity values are homogenous of degree
one in the face value of debt, B, we derive time-invariant dynamic
equilibrium capital structure strategies that only depend on the firm’s
inverse leverage ratio, y. Specifically, equityholders’ capital structure
strategy, S, consists of the initial leverage, ý and debt maturity, m, a
time-invariant rollover schedule δ(y), which determines the refinancing
of expiring debt as a function of leverage as well as two time-invariant
leverage thresholds, y and y. As mentioned above, the specific choices of
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can be written as
S = {δ(y),y,y | ý,m}, (7)
with 0≤y≤ ý≤y,
0≤δ≤m.
Default is triggered at random time TD at which y first hits the lower
threshold y. In this case debtholders become the owners of the firm’s
productive assets, which they can re-lever optimally. If y first hits the
upper threshold, y, at random time TK , then all debt is repurchased
and the firm is subsequently re-levered optimally.12 Thus, both at the
default boundary and at the recapitalization boundary the firm becomes
unlevered and its owners will therefore find it optimal to choose the
initial leverage ý and maturity m.
Next, we present the values of equity and debt for a given strategy
of type (7). We hereby use the fact that the value of equity and debt
are functions of the state variables B and y, and that valuations are
homogeneous in B. Therefore, we write E(B,y)=BẼ(y) and D(B,y)=
BD̃(y).
Proposition 1. For a given capital structure strategy (7), the value
of equity and debt per unit of face value of debt, Ẽ(y) and D̃(y), must
12 Equityholders’ recapitalization and default strategies can be interpreted as indicator
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+(r(1−τp)−µ̂)y (equity valuation) (8)

















+(i(1−τp)+m) (debt valuation) (11)










D̃(y) = 1+λ (debt at recapitalization)(13)
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Before determining the optimal equilibrium rollover rate δ, we discuss
the system of equations stated in Proposition 1. Valuation equations for
equity and debt, (8) and (11), are standard HJB equations, with the
exception that the rollover rate δ(y) determines the dynamics of the
state y cash flows to investors. They have analytically tractable solutions
for all possible ranges of rollover rates, that is, 0≤δ(y)≤m.
Equation (9) reflects the absolute priority rule that makes equity
worthless in default, occurring at y. At the upper restructuring threshold
y, all debt is repurchased at a premium over face value equal to (1+λ)
and the firm recapitalizes to the initial inverse leverage ratio of ý. The
value of equity at y is therefore endogenously determined by the value
of the total firm minus costs associated with the recapitalization, stated
in Equation (10). Boundary condition (12) defines the value of debt in
default as the value of the newly re-levered firm (at inverse leverage ratio
ý) minus bankruptcy costs, g. If this does not result in a positive value,
the firm is liquidated, and debtholders get zero. Finally, condition (13)
states that at the upper restructuring threshold, debtholders get paid
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In the setup explained above, the valuation of corporate debt depends
on the capital structure strategy, conjectured by bond investors. At the
same time, the firm’s (i.e., equityholders’) capital structure decisions
depend on the valuation of the debt claims. This is so since equity value
and debt value are interrelated, as can be seen from Equations (5) and
(6). In particular, the equity value in Equation (5) depends on debt
valuation via the proceeds from debt issuance, (1−ki)δsD(Bs,ys).13
Similarly, debt value in Equation (6) depends on equity valuation via
the equityholders’ rollover decision, δ, and via the value given default,
DD, which constitutes the total value of the optimally restructured firm.
Consequently, the optimal capital structure strategy and securities
valuation must satisfy equilibrium conditions. That is, investors price
securities based on a conjectured capital structure strategy, and firms
must have no incentive to deviate from the conjectured strategy if
securities are priced in this way. Employing the theory of stochastic
control, we therefore model a dynamic game and derive a Markov-perfect
Nash equilibrium in which debtholders price debt based on rational
beliefs about equityholders’ capital structure strategy and equityholders
correctly anticipate the pricing of debt claims when making capital
structure decisions.14
Appendixes A.3 and A.4 formally derive the optimal equilibrium
strategy. The key feature of the equilibrium strategy is that the optimal
rollover depends on the value of debt relative to the value of equity (and
its first derivative), which can be expressed as the critical threshold,
D̃I(y), given in the following proposition.

















Equityholders are indifferent between all feasible rollover rates, δ(y), if
D̃(y)=D̃I(y). Proof: See Appendix A.3.
According to Proposition 2, equityholders wish to fully rollover
expiring debt and therefore set δ∗(y)=m if debt value is above
13 In addition, the value VK , which represents the value of the optimally re-levered firm after
restructuring debt, depends on the market value of debt at the optimal initial leverage
ratio.
14 See, for example, the chapter on optimal stochastic control in Björk (2004) or the chapter
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the critical threshold D̃I(y). For debt values below this threshold,
equityholders do not rollover debt at all by setting δ∗(y)=0. Finally,
when debt value matches the threshold value D̃I(y), equityholders are
indifferent between alternative values of δ(y).
The economic intuition behind this optimal decision rule can be
seen by considering equityholders’ costs and benefits from issuing an
additional unit of debt. Issuing an additional unit of debt generates
net proceeds of (1−ki)D̃(y). On the other hand, the additional debt
issue increases the firm’s leverage (decreases y) and, thus, reduces the
valuation of equity. This valuation effect is given by dEdB = Ẽ(y)−y
∂Ẽ(y)
∂(y) .
Equating these costs and benefits and solving for the critical debt value
yields D̃I(y) in Equation (14).
One might suspect that the optimal debt rollover is of a bang-bang
type, that is, that δ∗ is either at its minimum, δ∗=0, or at its maximum,
δ∗=0 and that the states y at which debt value exactly equals D̃I(y)
serve as singular switching points where the optimal debt strategy jumps
from δ∗=0 to δ∗=m or vice versa. However, we will demonstrate below
that, for sufficiently short debt maturities, there exist extended regions
of firm leverage, where an interior choice 0<δ∗<m is the equilibrium. In
this region, the optimal rollover rate δ∗(y) is set such that the resultant
debt value exactly matches the critical threshold (14), which in turn
makes equityholders indifferent between alternative rollover rates.
Interior optima arise in state y, where neither δ=0 nor δ=m are
feasible equilibrium solutions. This is the case if the choice δ=0 results
in a debt valuation D̃(y)>D̃I(y), which according to the decision rule
(15) implies an optimal choice of δ=m or, alternatively, if full rollover,
that is, δ=m, implies a debt value D̃(y) below the critical threshold
D̃I(y), and therefore a rollover choice δ=0.
The following proposition summarizes valuation equations of equity
and debt in the interior equilibrium as well as the equilibrium rollover
rate together with conditions that ensure the stability of the equilibrium,
that is, conditions that ensure that a small perturbation of the
conjectured rollover rate does not destroy the equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In an interior equilibrium 0<δ∗<m the value of
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In particular, equity valuation (16) is independent of the rollover rate,
while δ∗ is strictly positive in this region. Furthermore, the existence of
an interior equilibrium implies that equity is convex in y and that the








Proof: See Appendix A.4.
We can now derive equity and debt valuation expressions for the
three strategy regions. In the first one, δ(y)=m, that is, equityholders
fully rollover expiring debt, since proceeds from issuing new debt at
market value are sufficiently high to make the choice of the maximum
rollover rate that the covenant allows optimal. In the second one δ(y)=0,
proceeds from reissuing expiring debt at market value excessively dilutes
the firm’s equity and, thus, equityholders do not wish to issue any
new debt. Finally, in the region with interior rollover we know from
Proposition 2 that equityholders are indifferent between all feasible
choices of δ(y). Substituting D̃(y)=D̃(y)I into the valuation equation
(8) lets δ vanish from the valuation equation, that is, the value of equity
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Proposition 4. In a region at which the firm fully rolls over its debt,


























In a region at which the firm rolls over its debt at an interior optimum







In the region in which the firm funds repayment of retiring debt entirely













The exponents β and γ are the characteristic roots of the homogeneous

















































The constants E1,2 and D1,2 can be determined for each region by
the proper boundary conditions that ensure that value functions are
continuous across changes in the rollover regime.
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2.2 Endogenous Bankruptcy and Optimal Discrete
Recapitalization
While the choice of the rollover threshold δ(y) constitutes instantaneous
stochastic control, the selection of the recapitalization threshold y
as well as the choice of the bankruptcy threshold y are optimal
stopping problems.15 Proper boundary conditions (9), (10), (12), and
(13) determine equity and debt values at these critical thresholds.
First-order conditions of optimality at the upper and the lower
reorganization thresholds follow from inspecting boundary conditions
(10) and (12) with respect to an equity value-maximizing choice of
the reorganization thresholds y and y. This leads to the following
“smooth pasting” or “super contact” conditions (for a discussion of these
optimality conditions, see Dixit 1993; Dumas 1991),
∂Ẽ
∂y










These conditions together with optimal rollover determine equity-
holders’ optimal capital structure strategy contingent on all-equity firm
owners’ initial choice of leverage and debt maturity, S={δ(y),y,y | ý,m}.
As discussed above, discrete refinancing at y or y creates an unlevered
firm, which all-equity owners will re-lever immediately.
A discussion of optimal debt rollover, δ, near bankruptcy closes this
section. In Proposition 5 below, we will prove that in any state y, which is
sufficiently close to the bankruptcy state y, firms find it optimal to fully
rollover expiring debt, that is, to set δ equal to m. In other words, when
cash flows are sufficiently low, setting δ<m and thus reducing leverage
would transfer wealth from equityholders to remaining debtholders. To
see this, note that setting δ<m reduces the overall face value of debt
outstanding and therefore increases the value of the remaining bonds in
bankruptcy. For sufficiently bad states, this value transfer to remaining
bondholders dominates any potential benefits to equityholders, since
bankruptcy occurs in any case with very high probability.16 Thus,
in bad states the firm faces a classical debt overhang problem where
equityholders do not engage in debt reducing activities. Instead, they
15 Optimal instantaneous rollover, δ(y), and discrete reorganization at y, y are optimized
simultaneously.
16 This can be seen most intuitively if one considers the effects of a debt reduction for
given default decisions. Remaining bondholders benefit from the debt reduction since
they receive a higher value per unit of face value in default. Equityholders do not enjoy a
similar benefit, since they receive zero in bankruptcy, independent of the shortfall of firm
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wish to minimize their investment in debt reduction near the bankruptcy
boundary, by choosing the highest feasible debt rollover rate. This is
formally stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If loss-given-default is strictly less than 100%, it
is optimal to rollover debt at the maximum rate δ=m for y in a
neighborhood above the bankruptcy threshold y.
(See Appendix A.6 for the proof of Proposition 5.)
2.3 Optimal Initial Leverage
All-equity firms choose target leverage ý and average debt maturity m to
maximize total firm value, fully anticipating the effects on equityholders’
optimal capital structure strategy SE . We assume that i is set such that
debt is initially issued at par,17
choose i such that D(ý,B)=B. (20)




with the first-order conditions
∂V
∂m









(V (ý,B;ý,m)−krB) = 0. (23)
The optimization problem of all-equity owners after recapitalization is
identical to the problem of the initial firm owners who decide over initial
leverage and maturity since capital structure strategies S preserve the
model’s linear homogeneity in the debt level B. Hence, the initial choice
of ý, m, and i is identical to the choice made by all-equity owners after
reorganization at y or y.
3. Calibration
For our numerical analysis our parameters are calibrated to capture
important features of the U.S. tax code, which are also shared by
many other countries.18 First, debt coupons are deductible from the
17 Without such an assumption, the joint choice of face value and coupon rate is ambiguous.
(20) resolves this ambiguity and preserves homogeneity in B.
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corporate tax base. Second, income from interest bearing investments
is more heavily taxed than income from equity investments. In the
United States, interest income is treated as ordinary income and we
calibrate this to the maximum tax rate on wage income. Prior to the
2018 tax reform, this amounted to 39.6% plus a 3.8% Medicare surtax on
investment income. By contrast, high-income earners only pay 20% tax
on dividend income plus 3.8% for Medicare, that is, 23.8%. To keep the
analysis tractable, our model only explicitly considers a personal tax on
debt income, but not on equity income. To capture the tax disadvantage
of interest income over income from equity in our reduced-form model,
we set the personal tax rate on debt equal to the difference between the
43.4% tax on debt income and the 23.8% tax on equity income, that is,
τp=19.6%.
At the corporate level, we assume that income is taxed at a constant
statutory rate, τc, which we calibrate to empirically effective marginal
tax rates. For this purpose, we use two sources of information. First,
we use marginal tax rates from COMPUSTAT MTR database, which
employs the nonparametric estimation method introduced by Blouin,
Core, and Guay (2010) that explicitly takes care of mean reversion of
corporate income. We merge the MTR database with COMPUSTAT
firm characteristics to calculate total-asset-weighted average marginal
tax rates after interest expense over the available horizon from 1994
to 2012, which yields 30.6%. Average marginal tax rates peak in 1993
(33.0%) and are lowest in 2010 (22.0%).
Second, as a robustness check, we analyze John Graham’s file of
simulated tax rates.19 The average marginal tax rate after interest
expense over the last 20 years, that is, from 1994 to 2013, is estimated
to be 25.9%. Again, average simulated marginal tax rates in the sample
period are lowest in 2010 (18.7%) and highest in 1995 (30.7%). The
total-asset-weighted average marginal tax rate before interest expenses
over the stated period is 33.1%. This is close to the asset-weighted mean
value from COMPUSTAT MTR reported above. In the base case of our
numerical analysis, we therefore use a corporate tax rate of 30.6%. We
also provide comparative statics for our tax parameters to illustrate how
sensitive our results are to changing tax rates.
Recent empirical estimates of corporate bankruptcy costs have con-
siderably changed the academic community’s view of their magnitude.
Early papers estimated bankruptcy costs by investigating sets of
19 We thank John Graham for providing us with his comprehensive set of simulated marginal
tax rates covering the period from 1980 to 2013 and for his advice on calibrating our model
to the U.S. tax code. Please see Graham (1996a) and Graham (1996b) for details about
the applied simulation procedure. Graham and Mills (2008) use the federal government’s
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defaulted firms and estimating these costs to be only a few percent
of the firm’s asset value.20 More recently, researchers have accounted
for the fact that a subset of defaulted firms is likely to produce a biased
bankruptcy cost estimate for the entire population of firms. They argue
that low-destress cost firms are overrepresented in this sample and, thus,
existing estimates of bankruptcy costs might be significantly downward
biased. Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017) infer implied distress
costs from market prices of equity and prices of put options employing a
dynamic capital structure model. They show that estimated bankruptcy
costs vary considerably across industries from below 10% to well over
60% with typical values in the range between 20% to 30%. In our
calibration we refer to Glover (2016), who estimates parameters of a
structural trade-off model of the firm with time-varying macroeconomic
conditions by employing simulated methods of moments. He estimates
the mean firm’s cost of default with 45% and the median firm’s cost with
37% of asset value. Our model specifies bankruptcy costs as a fraction g
of the face value of debt. Thus, aiming for a base case parametrization
that resembles median bankruptcy costs, we select g such that a firm
with optimally chosen debt maturity experiences bankruptcy costs of
37% of its asset value. This leads to a base case parameter of g = 34.39%.
Below, we provide comparative statics to estimate the effect of varying
bankruptcy costs (e.g., across industries).
[Table 2 about here.]
4. Debt Maturity, Capital Structure Dynamics, and Firm Value
We start by analyzing the effect of average debt maturity on the firm’s
optimal refinancing decision. If not otherwise mentioned, we use the
base case parameters listed in Table 2. First, we explore firms that
have issued debt with long maturity. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates
the optimal rollover rate nomalized by the retirement rate, δ/m, over
the inverse leverage ratio y for a bond with long maturity, T =30 years,
m=0.03̇. Since the state variable y is proportional to the firm’s cash
flow level, y serves as a proxy of the firm’s profitability. We can see that
equityholders optimally choose to rollover all expiring debt (δ/m=1)
over a large range of firm states, especially in bad states, that is, low y.
Only immediately before calling the bonds to subsequently issue more
debt, that is, in a region near y, does it become optimal for equityholders
to use equity to repay maturing debt. The intuition for this latter result
is straightforward. In this leverage region, it is optimal to use retained
20 See, for example, the following papers for studies on default costs (estimated averages are
in parentheses): Warner (1977) (5.3%), Ang, Chua, and McConnell (1982) (mean 7.5%,
median 1.7%), Weiss (1990) (3.1%), Altman (1984) (6.0%), and Andrade and Kaplan
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earnings to finance principal repayments since it would be inefficient to
incur transaction costs for a new bond issue, knowing that the bond will
be called in the near future with high probability.
[Figures 1a and 1b about here.]
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the optimal rollover rate, δ/m, for a bond
with a T =10-year maturity, m=0.1. In contrast to the 30-year bond,
debt with a shorter maturity is not fully rolled over if the firm’s state
deteriorates. There is a region of y below the initial inverse leverage ý
near the bankruptcy threshold y, where rollover is an interior optimum
as derived in Propositions 2 and 3. Intuitively, under full rollover, prices
of new bonds would be too low, since they reflect high leverage and
future costs of financial distress. It is in equityholders’ own interest
to partly use equity to refund maturing debt, despite the fact that
it implicitly also benefits the remaining bondholders. In equilibrium,
bondholders anticipate this and price bonds more attractively.
When increasing debt maturity above a critical value, this region of
debt reduction vanishes. Under base case parametrization, the critical
maturity at which this happens is T =23.86 years, m=0.04192. This
is the shortest maturity without debt reduction. Debt with maturity
shorter than this critical value induces debt reduction, maturities longer
than this critical value do not induce debt reductions in bad states.
Interestingly, the firm’s willingness to use equity to repay debt is
nonmonotonic in the inverse leverage ratio, y. When the firm approaches
bankruptcy, that is, for y near y, equityholders terminate their effort to
reduce debt. In this region, they once again fully rollover debt and dilute
existing debtholders by reissuing the expired debt. This is in accordance
with Proposition 5, which proves that when loss-given-default is less
than 100%, firms engage in full rollover when close to bankruptcy.
Thus, when pushed very close to bankruptcy, equityholders are no longer
willing to make additional voluntary equity investments in the firm. On
the contrary, they would rather issue new debt at the maximum rate
allowed by debt covenants, even if this can only be done at unfavorable
prices, that is, when high credit spreads are charged by investors.
Figure 1 also reveals an additional range in which the firm does not
fully rollover maturing debt. This occurs when the inverse leverage ratio
approaches ȳ, that is, the threshold, at which all outstanding debt is
repurchased and replaced by a new, larger debt issue. The intuition
for this is straightforward. In this range it would not be worthwhile
to incur the transaction costs associated with debt rollover, since the
firm anticipates that the repurchase of the entire outstanding debt is
imminent. Thus, transaction costs associated with debt rollover are not
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shields. In this region, repaying maturing debt with retained earnings is
optimal.21
To summarize, the above numerical analysis generates four main
insights. First, for sufficiently long maturities, equityholders never use
retained earnings or equity issues to repay maturing debt, except
immediately before a discrete leverage increase. This result changes
if the average debt maturity is shortened. In this case, there exists a
range of leverage ratios strictly above the initial optimum for which
equityholders find it optimal to partly use retained earnings of equity to
repay maturing debt. This is in accordance with the evidence presented
in Section 5 and with the findings of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman
(2001), who report that long-term debt is an impediment to movements
toward the target leverage ratio.
Second, at the initial leverage ratio, ý, the firm always holds its debt
level constant and fully rolls over maturing debt, δ=m. This follows
directly from the optimality of the initial leverage ratio.
Third, near the restructuring threshold, y, the firm entirely refrains
from issuing debt. In this range, incurring the transaction costs
associated with debt rollover would not be worthwhile, since the
firm anticipates that the repurchase of the entire outstanding debt is
imminent.
Fourth, near the bankruptcy threshold, y, the firm fully rolls over
all expiring debt, that is, δ=m. Thus, even with short-term debt
outstanding, equityholders resume issuing debt if the leverage ratio
becomes sufficiently high. In this case, equityholders are no longer willing
to invest in debt reductions to keep their equity option alive. This latter
result follows from Proposition 5.22
Bankruptcy costs, corporate taxes, and critical debt
maturity: We find that bankruptcy costs as well as the magnitude
of the tax shield of debt financing represent the main determinants for
the critical average maturity that triggers voluntary debt reductions.
The lower the bankruptcy costs the shorter the maturity required to
provide incentives for voluntary debt reductions. Figure 2 plots the
critical average maturity over bankruptcy costs for two different levels
21 This region at which debt is not rolled over in states close to y has a negligible effect
on total firm value, as we will discuss below when we calibrate the model. This is so
since firms spend only a small fraction of time in this region and because there are no
significant agency problems associated with the rollover behavior of the firm in this region,
since debt is essentially riskless. In contrast, the effect of debt reduction in bad states of
the firm has a large effect on firm value, as we argue throughout the paper. We quantify
the valuation effect of the former region below, when discussing optimal maturity choice
and the associated tax benefits of debt.
22 In the Internet Appendix B.1, we derive a condition under which firms never have an
incentive to increase the debt retirement rate m above the originally contracted level.
This condition holds in all of our numerical analyses and is a manifestation of the leverage
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of corporate tax, τc. The lower line represents our base case, where the
corporate tax rate is calibrated to the average marginal tax rate provided
by COMPUSTAT MTR database (τc = 30.6%, see Section 3).
The upper line represents critical debt maturities over bankruptcy
costs when using the lower average effective corporate tax rate implied
by the marginal tax rate data provided by John Graham (τc = 25.9%,).
It is evident, that in the case of higher tax shields it requires shorter
debt maturities to induce sufficient incentive for equityholders to engage
in active debt reduction when the firm’s cash flows deteriorate. This
result is quite intuitive, since actively replacing retired debt with equity
reduces the firms tax shields and, hence, providing larger tax shields
reduces the incentive to substitute debt with equity.
With base case parameterization, that is, τc=30.6%, g=34.39%,
debt maturity below the critical maturity of 23.86 years induces debt
reductions in bad times. With lower tax shields, using τc=25.9% the
critical debt maturity at g=34.39% is 33.4 years. Bankruptcy costs
as low as g=25% require average maturities of 15.49 years and 21.53
years when using corporate tax rates of 30.6% and 25.8%, respectively.
Bankruptcy costs as high as g=45% induce debt reduction for average
maturities below 37.16 and 53.07 years, respectively. Thus, with lower
bankruptcy costs, it needs shorter-term debt to induce debt reductions.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Debt maturity and firm value: Next, we consider the effect of
debt maturity on firm value and illustrate the potential benefit of
a short-term debt maturity with base case parameters. Results for
different parameterizations are reported below. Figure 3 displays the
tax advantage, that is, the extent to which the value of the optimally
levered firm exceeds the value of the unlevered productive assets as a
function of the retirement rate of debt, m.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The figure also displays the relative value of a reference firm (dotted
line), which is assumed to always fully rollover maturing debt with new
debt issues.23 For the reference firm, total firm value is maximized by
choosing the longest possible maturity for its debt, as reported in Leland
(1994b) and Leland and Toft (1996). By contrast, if the firm can engage
in debt reductions, the relationship between total firm value and the
maturity structure of debt is not monotonic.24 This is so because debt
with sufficiently short maturity induces more efficient capital structure
adjustments by equityholders when the firm’s cash flows decrease,
23 This is modeled as in Leland (1994b). In addition, we also allow the firm to increase its
debt by repurchasing all debt outstanding and to issue a higher amount of debt.
24 Evidence for this nonmonotonicity is provided by Guedes and Opler (1996), who report
that investment grade firms seem to be indifferent between issuing debt at the long end
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thereby lowering probability of default and, hence, expected bankruptcy
costs. This result is driven by the fact that the firm with the higher
fraction of maturing debt (shorter maturity) essentially has greater
flexibility of managing, that is, reducing, its leverage in the relatively
bad states. This flexibility increases the value of the firm since it can
operate with higher debt ratios, thereby shielding its taxable income
more effectively.25
As illustrated in Figure 3, the beneficial effect of shorter debt maturity
on future capital structure dynamics outweighs the disadvantage due
to higher transactions costs from rolling over maturing debt. In the
base case, overall firm value is maximized at a debt maturity of ≈4.26
years.26,27
Debt capacity: The commitment effect of debt maturity also has
a significant effect on the optimal initial leverage ratio. In contrast
to existing results in the finance literature, we find that shorter debt
maturities lead to higher debt capacities.
Figure 4 illustrates this effect. The figure plots the initial optimal
leverage as a function of m for the base case firm. Unlike firms that
must rollover all maturing debt, firms that choose the rollover rate
optimally actually increase their debt capacity as they shorten their debt
maturities. The optimal initial leverage increases from approximately
39% for perpetual bonds and reaches its maximum with 80% at an
average debt maturity of approximately 1.5 years. For very short
maturities, debt capacity decreases, due to the transaction costs incurred
when rolling over debt. At the firm-maximizing debt maturity of 4.26
years, the firm’s debt capacity is approx. 65%.
Compared to the models of Leland (1994b), Leland and Toft (1996),
or Leland (1998), our model generates higher initial target leverage
ratios. However, over the lifetime of the firm, average leverage ratios are
comparable. The relatively high initial leverage in our model is due to
the fact that investors rationally anticipate low bankruptcy risk due to
less than full debt rollover in bad states. This commitment effect of short
debt maturities leads to higher initial but similar average leverage ratios
25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing this intuition.
26 We simulate 50,000 firms over 100 years and find that the optimally levered firm (optimal
maturity ≈4.26 years) spends on average 8.9% of the time in states of debt reduction.
Debt reduction decreases the risk-neutral probability of default to 0.3% per year compared
to a 1.3% default probability per year of a firm with an optimal amount of infinite horizon
debt, which is the optimal maturity choice when debt must always be fully rolled over.
27 It is part of the optimal strategy that equityholders stop debt rollover close to the
restructuring boundary y to save transaction costs. In contrast to the region at which
the firm does not fully rollover debt in bad states, the effects of stopping rollover in good
states on firm value are small. In our calibrated base case, a firm following the optimal
rollover restructures at a leverage ratio 1/y=35.16%, while a firm that does not stop
rollover near the restructuring boundary chooses to restructure at a leverage ratio of
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due to subsequent leverage reductions. Lower initial leverage ratios
would obtain if debt maturities were lumpy. In this case the leverage
reducing effect of maturing debt would only take place at discrete points
in time.28
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.1 Comparative statics
In this section, we explore the effect of various model parameters on
firm value, optimal debt maturity and dynamic capital structure policy.
Bankruptcy costs: We first focus on the role of bankruptcy costs.
The key role of bankruptcy costs for the commitment to debt reductions
was already discussed above. Figure 5 plots the tax advantage of debt,
that is, the extent to which the initial firm value exceeds the unlevered
firm value, for different levels of bankruptcy costs. Several effects can
be seen: (a) lower bankruptcy costs require a shorter debt maturity in
order to induce voluntary debt reductions; (b) lower bankruptcy costs
reduce the maximum attainable tax advantage of debt; (c) lowering
bankruptcy costs moves the optimal finite maturity toward shorter
maturities, and (d) for very low bankruptcy costs, it becomes relatively
more advantageous to issue console bonds.
The most surprising effect is that higher bankruptcy costs imply
higher firm values. Higher bankruptcy costs make it easier for
equityholders to credibly commit to debt reductions. The resultant
decrease in the expected probability of bankruptcy more than offsets
the effect of the increased costs given a default.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Transaction costs: The costs associated with rolling over debt are
another key determinant of firm value when finite maturity debt is
issued. Figure 6 illustrates the effect on firm value for different values of
ki. When moving to lower values of ki, we observe that (a) firms with
shorter-term debt gain relatively more and (b) the local maximum of
total firm value for finite debt maturity moves toward shorter maturities.
In our model, transaction costs, ki, are assumed to be proportional to the
notional amount of debt that is rolled over. Thus, shorter bond maturity
is, ceteris paribus, associated with higher costs per unit of time.29
28 As discussed in the introduction, Geelen (2016) and Chen, Xu, and Yang (2020) analyze
the polar opposite case, in which only a single debt maturity is outstanding. This
indeed leads to lower initial target leverage and higher expected bankruptcy probabilities,
compared to our setup. Analyzing the effect of different degrees of maturity granularity
appears to be a fruitful avenue for future research.
29 One could argue that the burden of the higher transaction costs for lower maturities
actually reduces bond prices and, in turn, incentivizes equityholders to engage in debt
reductions, rather than short debt maturity by itself. To ensure this is not the case, we
solve a model that features constant transaction costs per unit of time, mki=const. Thus,
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[Figure 6 about here.]
Cash flow characteristics: Figure 7 shows how changes in cash
flow characteristics affect total firm value. Panel 7a plots the initial
tax advantage as a function of the retirement rate for several values
of cash flow volatility, σ. Moving to higher volatilities (a) results in
lower firm value, (b) requires shorter debt maturity to induce debt
reductions, and (c) moves the local maximum of total firm value toward
shorter maturity debt. High cash flow volatilities reduce the firm’s debt
capacity but increase the option value for equityholders and thus make
them more reluctant to default on their debt obligations. This makes the
commitment effect of short-term debt relatively less advantageous and
requires shorter debt maturities to induce voluntary debt reductions.
Panel 7b displays the tax advantage of debt as a function of the
retirement rate for several values of the risk-adjusted cash flow growth
rate µ̂. Moving to higher growth (a) increases firm value and (b)
shifts optimal maturity toward long-term debt. This is so since the
commitment to decrease leverage in response to decreasing cash flows is
less valuable for firms with high expected cash flow growth rates.
[Figures 7a and 7b about here.]
Bankruptcy costs and debt capacity: Next, Figure 8 plots the
firm’s optimal initial leverage ratio, which we refer to as the firm’s
debt capacity, for different debt maturities and for different levels of
bankruptcy costs. Consistent with the findings reported above, higher
bankruptcy costs are associated with a higher debt capacity since
equityholders can commit to debt reductions when cash flows decrease.
This results in a reduced bankruptcy probability, which more than
offsets the higher bankruptcy costs conditional on default.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Firm value and corporate tax rates: Finally, Figure 9 shows
the tax advantage of debt plotted against the retirement rate m for
the base case firm with τc=30.6%. As a comparison we plot the tax
advantage when corporate taxes are estimated from John Graham’s
marginal tax rate data, τc=25.9%. Higher tax shields caused by higher
corporate tax rates lead to (a) lower optimal debt maturity and (b)
a higher tax advantage at the optimal debt maturity. While a higher
corporate tax rate intuitively leads to a higher tax advantage if debt is
used optimally, the result that higher tax rates reduce optimal maturity
is less obvious. As a direct consequence, higher tax rates make debt
reduction less desirable, because reducing debt diminishes the associated
tax shield. A secondary effect is that debt capacity increases with shorter
debt, so that the transaction costs per period are the same for different maturities. Under
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debt, and higher debt capacity ex ante allows the firm to use debt more
aggressively, which increases the debt tax shield. From Figure 9, we see
that the latter effect dominates the direct effect, and, overall, higher
corporate tax rates reduce optimal debt maturity, from an optimal
average maturity of 6.25 years for τc=25.9% to 4.26 years in the base
case with an effective corporate tax rate of τc=30.6%.
[Figure 9 about here.]
5. Evidence
Our analysis generates several predictions linking capital structure
choices to various firm characteristics. Most importantly, the analysis
implies a distinct relation between debt maturity and leverage dynamics,
that is, firms with shorter debt maturities exhibit more pronounced
debt reductions when firm value drops. In addition, the model implies
relations between debt maturities and firm characteristics, such as cash
flow volatilities, corporate tax rates, or bankruptcy costs. This section
discusses evidence on these model predictions. Although not intended to
represent a fully-fledged empirical test, it documents that even simple
analyses reveal patterns that accord well with our theory.
5.1 Sample construction
To relate our theoretical predictions to evidence, we use annual
Compustat data for the period from April 1962 to March 2017. As in
Graham and Leary (2011), and DeAngelo, Gonçalves, and Stulz (2018),
we exclude firms not incorporated in the United States, utilities (SIC
codes in the range 4900 to 4949), financials (SIC codes 6000 to 6999),
and firm-years in which the book value of total assets is below US$10
million. We select only firm-years for which either long-term debt or
debt in short-term liabilities are available (as in DeAngelo, Gonçalves,
and Stulz 2018). We exclude observations with missing total assets,
cash, or market capitalization (i.e., share price at the end of fiscal year
times common shares outstanding), with negative net-debt ratio and with
negative cash. Finally, we truncate the data at the 97.5% EBIT volatility
quantile to exclude implausibly high values. This results in a sample of
73,640 firm-years.
To measure the extent to which a firm uses short-term debt in its
capital structure, we calculate the fraction of debt due within 3 years,
normalized by total debt.30 Market leverage is measured as long-term
debt plus debt in short-term liabilities over the total market value of
the firm’s assets (total liabilities plus market capitalization). We use the
30 Our findings are qualitatively robust to alternative definitions of short-term debt. For
example, we have also used debt due within 2 years to total assets as a measure of short-
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net debt ratio (i.e., book leverage minus cash ratio) to calculate changes
in leverage over consecutive years.
5.2 Empirical findings
In a first step we analyze whether firms’ leverage changes are associated
with the fraction of short-term debt. To do this we calculate transition
probabilities in the spirit of DeAngelo, Gonçalves, and Stulz (2018),
who show that firms with high market leverage tend to reduce their
net debt ratio. We build on their study and apply a double sort. First,
with respect to market leverage, and second, with respect to short-term
leverage, that is, debt due within 3 years as a fraction of total debt.
Along both dimensions, we sort firms into quintiles. Break points for
short-term debt sorts are 7.40%, 15.89%, 26.64%, and 42.91% of debt
due within 3 years. Break points for market leverage sorts are 7.05%,
14.95%, 25.13%, and 41.34%.31
Table 3 states the number of observations in each bucket. We see
that buckets along the main diagonal are most densely populated, that
is, firms’ market leverage and their fraction of short-term debt are
positively correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 28.85%.
[Table 3 about here.]
Our capital structure theory predicts that firms with higher levels of
short-term debt have stronger incentives to reduce debt than firms with
longer debt maturities. Furthermore, our results also imply that the
incentive to delever is nonmonotonic in market leverage. Moving from
low market leverage to high market leverage, the incentive to delever first
increases, but for very high market leverage, the incentive to reduce net
debt vanishes.
Table 4 explores evidence for these predictions. It reports the average
changes in net debt ratios, stated as a percentage and measured
over the year that follows the sort.32 In each of the market leverage
buckets (columns of Table 4), firms with more short-term debt delever
significantly more (or lever less) than firms with low levels of short-term
debt.
For example, consider the column for market leverage 20%–40%,
which displays the change in the net debt ratio in the subsequent year for
firms in this market leverage bucket. It shows that firms in the bottom
quintile of usage of short-term debt, that is, row 0% to 20%, on average
31 In comparing these break points to our calibrated numerical examples, one needs to
consider that the above empirical values are based on a leverage definition that only
considers long-term debt plus debt in short liabilities. When focusing on firms’ total
liabilities, which include, for example, accounts receivables and pension obligations, one
obtains substantially higher leverage ratios. In this case, the firm at the 80th percentile
exhibits a market leverage of 71.4%.
32 We have also performed this analysis using changes in net debt ratios of the median firms,
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increase their net-debt ratio by approximately 1%. By contrast, firms
that are in the top quintile, that is, row 80%–100%, decrease their net-
debt ratio by approximately 1.9% in the subsequent year. In fact, as
can be seen from the first row of Table 4, the average firm that almost
entirely relies on long-term debt does not engage in leverage reductions,
regardless of its initial market leverage, consistent with our model.
Moving from low to high fractions of short-term debt, one observes that
firms increasingly engage in deleveraging. For example, row 5 shows that
the average firm that almost exclusively uses short-term debt and that
is in a market leverage bucket between 60% and 80% reduces its market
leverage in the subsequent year by more than 2%. These findings are
also in accordance with Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), who
also conclude that long-term debt hinders leverage reductions. Thus,
the first prediction of our theory seems to be empirically relevant and
strongly supported by firm behavior.
Next, we turn to the nonmonotonicity of leverage adjustments when
conditioned on initial market leverage. Recall that in our model firms
increase leverage when they reach a lower leverage threshold. Then,
for increasing initial market leverage ratios, firms do not adjust the face
value of debt over a range. Eventually they start reducing debt, by rolling
over less than 100% of the expiring debt before they start gambling for
resurrection by fully rolling over expiring debt again as they get close
to their bankruptcy thresholds. This predicted nonmonotonicity along
increasing initial market leverage is also apparent in Table 4. The change
in net debt is generally U shaped when moving from low to high market
leverage buckets. Consider row 3, for example. While firms in the market
leverage bucket 60% to 80% reduce their leverage in the following period
by approximately 1.5%, firms in the highest market leverage bucket, that
is, 80%–100% reduce leverage by only less than 1%. Consistent with
our model, firms with intermediate market leverage have the highest
incentive to reduce their leverage.
[Table 4 about here.]
We believe that the results in Table 4 understate the true
nonmonotonicity of debt reductions, since our data set does not fully
capture the leverage effects of firm defaults. Compustat has no flag
that indicates the reason a firm drops out of the database. However,
Table 5 shows that exits are more frequent for firms with high market
leverage. For example, Table 5 reveals that almost 6% of those firms in
the highest market leverage bucket exit the sample in the subsequent
year, whereas less than 3.4% of firms do so in the lowest market leverage
bucket. Hence, we conclude that part of this increase is due to more
frequent bankruptcies of firms in high leverage buckets. Since these firms
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nonmonotonicity of debt reductions is likely to be even more pronounced
than what is illustrated in Table 4.
[Table 5 about here.]
In addition to the main result that links debt maturity to firms’
propensities to delever, our model also delivers comparative statics
for debt maturities and firms’ corporate tax rates, their cash flow
volatilities, and their bankruptcy costs. To explore these predictions, we
use a simple linear regression framework, with the fraction of short-term
debt in a firm’s capital structure over total liabilities as the dependent
variable. Cash flow volatility is proxied by the standard deviation of
firms’ EBIT over total assets. We hereby require at least eight annual
observations. As a proxy for the corporate tax rate we use past income
taxes over EBIT averaged over the last 8 years. We use this definition
since a forward-looking measure of marginal tax rates, as analyzed in
Blouin, Core, and Guay (2010); Graham (1996a,b), would induce a
severe endogeneity problem. This is so since leverage changes directly
affect future effective corporate tax rates. Since bankruptcy costs are
not directly observable at the firm level, we use estimates provided by
Reindl, Stoughton, and Zechner (2017), aggregated for the Fama and
French 17 industries.
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 6 show univariate regressions of the fraction
of short-term debt over total liabilities on our proxies for bankruptcy
costs, cash flow volatility and corporate tax rates. Column 4 displays
the multivariate regression results for the three explanatory variables.
Column 5 also includes the additional controls suggested in table 1 of
Graham and Leary (2011).
Focusing first on columns 1 to 4, we can see that the coefficients
for the model-based explanatory variables all have the right sign in
the univariate regressions as well as in the multivariate regression.
Furthermore, RSZ MeanBC and ebitVola are both significant at the
1% level in all four regression specifications. Thus, higher bankruptcy
costs are associated with longer debt maturities, whereas higher cash
flow volatilities are associated with shorter debt maturities, consistent
with the model.
In column 5, we control for additional firm characteristics, such as size,
leverage, asset tangibility, profitability, and the market-to-book ratio of
equity. We see that the coefficient for ebitVola still remains positive
at the 1% significance level. The negative relation between short-term
debt usage and bankruptcy costs is also obtained with the extra control
variables. However, this latter result is no longer statistically significant.
When interpreting this, one needs to consider that the bankruptcy cost
proxies are necessarily noisy estimates of the firms’ true bankruptcy
costs, as they are aggregated at industry levels. For example, we know
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especially in size, which is usually highly right skewed. Therefore, the
bankruptcy costs of very large firms, expressed as a percentage of total
assets, are likely different from those of our proxies. We therefore also run
the regression with the control variables when we truncate observations
at the 95th percentile. As can be seen in column 6, for this sample the
coefficient for bankruptcy costs is indeed statistically significant and has
the predicted sign. We also note that the coefficients of the additional
control variables in columns 5 and 6 all have intuitive signs and are
highly significant, except for market-to-book ratio of equity, which is
insignificant.
[Table 6 about here.]
Thus, although the empirical analysis provided in this subsection
does not represent a full empirical test of our dynamic capital structure
theory, it produces evidence that supports the model predictions. Firms
with high ratios of short-term debt reduce leverage more aggressively
than firms with more long-term debt, and we provide support for
the predicted nonmonotonicity between leverage and subsequent debt
reductions. Furthermore, firms’ cash flow volatilities are positively
related to their usage of short-term debt, whereas their bankruptcy costs
are associated with longer debt maturities. While these results support
our model, some of the findings also may be consistent with other debt
maturity theories. We therefore believe that a detailed and fully-fledged
empirical analysis of the documented strong link between debt maturity,
delevering, and firm characteristics is a promising direction for future
research.
6. Conclusions
This paper explores the effects of debt maturity on subsequent dynamic
capital structure adjustments. We find that long debt maturities create
agency costs in states where the firm’s profitability is low, since
equityholders have no incentive to reduce debt. Thus, equityholders
of firms with long-term debt maturities “underinvest” in leverage
reductions in low-profitability states. By contrast, short debt maturities
imply a higher fraction of maturing debt, thereby creating more
flexibility to reduce leverage in bad states without transferring value
to debtholders and thereby mitigating the debt overhang problem.
This value-enhancing effect of short debt maturities must be traded off
against increased transaction costs associated with refinancing a larger
fraction of debt in any given period. This trade-off generates a new
theory of optimal debt maturity.
We find that the equityholders’ incentives to engage in debt reductions
is nonmonotonic in the firm’s leverage. For moderate drops in the
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repay maturing debt at least partly with equity, thereby mitigating the
leverage increasing effect of decreasing cash flows. However, if the firm’s
cash flows continue to drop until it is pushed toward bankruptcy, then
equityholders resume issuing new debt and gamble for resurrection.
Ex ante, the debt capacity of the firm increases if it uses debt
with sufficiently short maturity. We find that high costs of bankruptcy
induce a stronger incentive to use short-term debt since this reduces
the expected probability of bankruptcy for given debt level. Higher tax
shields caused by a higher corporate tax rate also makes shorter-term
debt more advantageous, since increased debt capacity associated with
short-term debt allows for a better utilization of debt tax shields. Since
long-term debt is stickier in downturns, it has a particularly adverse
effect on the probability of bankruptcy for higher risk firms. Firms with
higher cash flow risk therefore prefer shorter debt maturities.
In our numerical examples, the leverage-reducing effect of short debt
maturities in bad states leads to relatively high initial leverage ratios
and low bankruptcy probabilities. This is a direct consequence of the
perfectly granular maturity structure that we assume in our model. Any
lumpiness in firms’ debt maturities would limit the leverage and reduce
the effects that we identify to discrete points in time, whereas leverage
would still remain sticky in between maturity dates. Thus, exploring the
effects of lumpy debt maturities on initial leverage, leverage dynamics,
and bankruptcy probabilities appears to be a promising direction for
future research.
Our main findings and comparative statics accord well with empirical
studies and with our own evidence presented in this paper. Most
importantly, firms with high ratios of short-term debt reduce leverage
more aggressively in downturns; some evidence points to the predicted
nonmonotonicity between leverage and subsequent debt reductions; and
firms’ cash flow volatilities are positively related to their use of short-
term debt, whereas bankruptcy costs are associated with longer debt
maturities. Other empirical predictions of our theory, such as the effects
of growth or transaction costs on maturity, remain to be tested. Also, a
fully-fledged empirical test of how our theory of corporate debt maturity
stands up against alternative explanations would be interesting.
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A. Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Equation (4)
The inverse leverage ratio with respect to the unlevered firm value, yt, depends on
two state variables, the cash flow of the firm’s productive assets, ct, and the current
face value of debt, Bt. Thus one can write yt=y(ct,Bt). If the debt level is adjusted
by repurchasing all existing debt with face value Bt and issuing new debt with face



















In the absence of a discrete adjustment, the inverse leverage ratio, yt, follows a







































A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
For a given time-invariant, B-homogeneous capital structure strategy S of the form
(7), we can apply the theorem of Feynman and Kač (see, e.g., Øksendal 2003) and
transfer valuation equations (5) and (6) into partial differential equations that the
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exp. instantaneous growth in D driven
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(A6)
+ Bt(i(1−τp)+m)︸ ︷︷ ︸






At the reorganization thresholds y (default) and y (debt repurchase), boundary
conditions (9), (10), (12), and (13) must be satisfied. Assume, all market participants
correctly anticipate the firm’s capital structure strategy S. To avoid arbitrage,
the expected return of equity under the risk-neutral probability measure (right-
hand side of Equation (A5)) must equal the riskless (after personal tax) interest.
The expected return (under the risk-neutral measure) consists of the instantaneous
expected growth in the value of the equity claim (terms one to three) plus the net
cash flow to equity (remaining terms). For given capital structure strategy, the firm’s
debt level changes at a rate −(m−δ(y)), with m the contracted rate of amortization
and δ(y) the chosen reissuance schedule. Consequently, the drift rate of the inverse
leverage ratio yt is µ̂+(m−δt), which runs into the first term on the right-hand side of
(A5). The second term vanishes since there is no explicit time dependence of E. The
third term constitutes the expected change in the value of equity driven by changes
in the debt level B. The remaining terms on the left-hand side of (A5) characterize
the flow of cash to equity, expenses for coupon payment and debt amortization,
proceeds from reissuing new debt, and the after-tax cash flow from operations, c,
which is written as function of the state variables B and y according to Equation (2),
c=r(1−τp)−µ̂)yB. Equation (A6) follows the same logic for the value of debt, D.
The net cash flows to debtholders are characterized by the last two terms on the right-
hand side and consists of coupons and debt amortization as well as of expenditures
of debtholders for the purchase of new debt issues (at market price). We confirm
in Proposition 1, 3, and 4 that a B-homogeneous capital structure strategy S (see
Equation (7)) results in value functions that are linear-homogeneous in the debt level
B. Thus, we substitute E(B,y)=BẼ(y) and D(B,y)=BD̃(y) into Equations (A5)
and (A6). This yields Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equations (8) and (11) for equity
value and debt value per unit of face value of debt, Ẽ(y) and D̃(y), respectively.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
In this section we derive a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium capital structure
strategy where investors price debt based on rational beliefs about the firm’s debt
rollover, default and recapitalization decisions and, given these prices, firms have
no incentive to deviate from the conjectured capital structure strategy. There is no
precommitment, except that firms must repurchase the existing debt (i.e., eliminate
a debt covenant) before they can issue new debt with a higher face value.Proposition
1 states the system of valuation equations for a given strategy S. From there we
proceed in two steps. First, we determine the optimal equilibrium rollover rate δ
when bankruptcy and recapitalication thresholds y and y are given. In a second
step, we develop optimality conditions for the optimal choice of these thresholds.
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the perspective of total firm owners. Optimality conditions are discussed in Sections
2.2 and 2.3. In the first step, we formulate the dynamic game in which investors price
debt and equity based on rational beliefs about the firm’s optimal capital structure.
In the resultant Markov perfect Nash equilibrium, the conjectured optimal strategy
results in market values of debt and equity that do not create incentives for the
firm to deviate. See, for example, the chapter on optimal stochastic control in Björk
(2004) or the chapter on stochastic differential games in Dockner, Jørgensen, Van











Conjecturing that equityholders apply the optimal rollover δ∗ for given restructuring
thresholds y and y, we determine the resultant values of debt and equity must satisfy














...sup in (A7) is attained at δ∗, pointwise (verification)(A8)
0 = AδD̃(y)+(i(1−τp)+m)−(r(1−τp)+m)D̃(y) (debt valuation)(A9)
s.t. (12),(13).
Thus, if Ẽ and D̃ derived under anticipation of the optimal rollover schedule δ∗(y)
satisfy verification (A8), then Ẽ and D̃ are the value functions of equity and debt in
equilibrium, see Björk (2004). The first-order condition of optimal choice of δ in (A7)
is derived by differentiating the expression in the brackets with respect to δ, which
yields −y ∂Ẽ
∂y
(y)+Ẽ(y)−(1−ki)D̃(y). Hence, the derivative of δ is positive if and only
if D̃(y) exceeds the critical threshold D̃I(y) stated in Proposition 2. Consequently,
δ(y)=m is the optimal choice of the rollover rate in this case. If D̃(y)<D̃I(y), the
derivative is negative and, thus, δ(y)=0 is the optimal choice. Only if D̃(y)=D̃(y)I ,
equityholders are indifferent in their choice of δ(y). This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
While for D̃(y)<D̃I(y) and D̃(y)>D̃I(y) the choices δ(y)=0 and δ(y)=m are stable
equilibria (robust to perturbations in δ) we have to determine conditions under
which an interior choice of δ is a stable Nash equilibrium in the sense that small







/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhaa148/6124369 by Vienna U
niversity Library of Econom
ics and Business Adm
inistration user on 04 February 2021
A.1 illustrates a stable interior equilibrium. The bold line indicates equityholders’
optimal choice of δ contingent on the value of debt relative to the critical threshold
D̃I , as stated by Proposition 2. Interior optima arise at states y, where neither δ=0
nor δ=m are feasible equilibrium solutions. The marginal reaction of the market
value of debt to perturbations in the rollover rate can be derived as follows. Consider
a state y with 0<δ∗<m and increase debt rollover from the optimum equilibrium
rollover δ∗ to some δ for a time span of length dt. The resultant change in state y
equals ∆y=−(δ−δ∗)ydt, according to the dynamics of y in (4). And consequently,





That is, a positive perturbation in δ results in a marginal decrease in D̃ if and only
if ∂D̃
∂y
>0, which serves as a necessary condition for a stable interior equilibrium.
[Figure A.1 about here.]
One essential result of analyzing the interior equilibrium is that equityholders are
indifferent to the particular choice of δ, and their indifference allows for an analytical
solution of the entire problem. Since equityholders are indifferent, equity value in
a region with interior choice of δ∗ can be determined by simply setting δ=0 in
(8). Value of debt follows directly from D̃(y)=D̃I(y) and the particular value for
δ∗ is determined by substitution of D̃(y)=D̃I(y) into Equation (11) and solving
for δ. Finally we conclude that in an interior equilibrium equity must be convex.
Since D̃(y)=D̃I(y), we have
1−ki
y
(∂D̃/∂y)=(∂2Ẽ/∂y2)>0, since stability of the
equilibrium requires (∂D̃/∂y)>0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
In regions at which δ∗=m or δ∗=0, the value function for Ẽ and D̃ are the
general solutions of the second-order ordinary differential equations (8) and (11)
after substituting δ∗=m or δ∗=0. In a region of an interior equilibrium 0<δ∗<m
we know from Proposition 3 that D̃=D̃I . The value of equity must be the solution
of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (8) with the optimal δ∗ from Proposition
3 substituted for δ. After substitution, the valuation equation for equity becomes
independent of δ and exactly equal to the valuation equation for δ st to zero.
Therefore, the solution corresponds to the value function in regions with δ=0. This
is so because in an internal equilibrium the value of equity is invariant to the choice
of δ. The constants E1,2 and D1,2 are determined by boundary conditions (9), (10),
(12), and (13), which apply at y and y and by value matching and smooth-pasting
conditions at the interior boundary between the regions of full rollover, no rollover,
and partial rollover (see, e.g., Dixit (1993)). These conditions state that if such a
boundary, ỹ, is transitory (i.e., the state variable y can freely move back and forth
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These conditions yield a set of linear equations that determines all constants E and
D in the value functions stated in Proposition 4.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose loss-given-default is less than 100%. This is the case if g<1 and optimal
bankruptcy occurs at a level y such that the value of the remaining assets exceeds
bankruptcy costs. Then it follows from boundary condition (12) that D̃(y)>0.
However, for the value of equity and its partial derivative of the inverse leverage
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Table 1
Notation
A firm’s instantaneous free cash flow after corporate tax ct
Expected rate of change of ct µ
Risk-adjusted drift of the cash flow process µ̂
Riskless rate of interest r
Instantaneous variance of the cash flow process c2tσ
2
Face value of debt Bt
Debt retirement rate m
Average debt maturity T =1/m
Debt rollover rate δ
Value of equity E
Value of debt D
Total value of the firm V
Instantaneous coupon rate i
Firm’s inverse leverage ratio yt
Personal tax rate on ordinary income τp
Corporate tax rate τc
Proportional bankruptcy costs g
Proportional transaction costs for rolling over debt ki
Proportional transaction costs for issuing debt after Recapitalization kr
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Riskless rate of interest r 5 %
Personal tax rate τp 19.6 %
Corporate tax rate τc 30.6 %
Volatility of the cash flow process σ 13 %
Risk-adjusted drift µ̂ 0 %
Bankruptcy cost g 34.39%
Transaction costs for rolling over debt ki 0.5 %
Transaction costs after recapitalization kr 1 %
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m for m=0.1 (T =10)
Figure 1
Optimal debt rollover for long and short maturities
Panel A: Optimal rollover rate for a long-maturity bond, T =30 years, as a function of
the inverse leverage ratio y under base case parametrization (see Table 2). Low and high
levels of y correspond to states of low and high profitability of the firm. Equityholders
will not engage in debt reduction in bad states of the firm.
Panel B: A maturity of T =10 years serves as a commitment that equityholders will not
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g
τc = 25.9%, Graham
τc = 30.6%, base case, COMPUSTAT
T crit
Figure 2
Critical debt maturity that induces debt reduction
Critical average debt maturity below which the commitment to debt reductions in bad
times is credible as a function of bankruptcy costs. Critical maturities are plotted for the
base case parameterization τc=30.6%, which is the average marginal tax rate estimated
from COMPUSTAT MTR database, applying the approach of Blouin, Core, and Guay
(2010). Additionally, also plotted is critical maturity for the average tax rate from John
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V/( cr(1−τp)−µ̂ )− 1
Figure 3
Tax advantage and debt maturity
The tax advantage of debt at the optimal initial leverage for the base case firm
plotted against the retirement rate m. The dotted line represents the corresponding tax
advantage for a firm that has to keep the debt level constant and, therefore, rolls over
all expiring debt. The relation between the maturity structure of debt and firm value is
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Optimal initial leverage and debt maturity
Optimal initial leverage ratios, 1/ý, plotted over the retirement rate, m. Without allowing
for downward restructuring, debt capacity decreases when moving from long- to short-
term debt. For firms that explicitly consider debt reduction, debt capacity increases once
maturity is sufficiently short in order to commit to debt reductions to avoid financial
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V/( cr(1−τp)−µ̂ )− 1
Figure 5
Tax advantage and bankruptcy costs
Tax advantage plotted over the retirement rate, m, for different levels of bankruptcy
costs. Lower bankruptcy costs require a shorter debt maturity to induce voluntary
debt reductions and reduce the maximum attainable tax advantage of debt. Lowering
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V/( cr(1−τp)−µ̂ )− 1
Figure 6
Tax advantage and rollover costs
Tax advantage for different costs, ki, associated with rolling over debt plotted over the







/rfs/advance-article/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhaa148/6124369 by Vienna U
niversity Library of Econom
ics and Business Adm





V/( cr(1−τp)−µ̂ )− 1






V/( cr(1−τp)−µ̂ )− 1
(b) tax advantage for different values of
µ̂
Figure 7
Tax advantage and cash flow dynamics
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m
debt reduction







Optimal leverage and bankruptcy costs
Optimal initial leverage ratios, 1/ý, plotted over the retirement rate, m. High bankruptcy
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m
τc = 30.6% (COMPUSTAT MTR)
τc = 25.9% (Graham MTR)
V/( cr(1−τp)−µ̂ )− 1
Figure 9
Tax advantage and corporate tax
Tax advantage of debt for different levels of corporate tax, τc, plotted over the retirement
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Table 3
Number of observations in leverage buckets
Number of observations in the buckets created by the double sort on short-term debt, that is, debt
due within 3 years, normalized by total debt, and market leverage, that is, long-term debt plus debt
in short liabilities over the book value of total liabilities plus market capitalization of equity
Short-term Market leverage (quantile)
debt (quant.) 0%–20% 20%–40% 40%–60% 60%–80% 80%–100% Sum
0%–20% 4,115 3,318 2,945 2,448 1,892 14,718
20%–40% 3,644 3,363 3,213 2,698 1,899 14,817
40%–60% 3,137 3,161 3,062 3,022 2,512 14,894
60%–80% 2,740 2,970 3,019 3,074 3,016 14,819
80%–100% 1,372 2,031 2,503 3,444 5,042 14,392
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Table 4
Short-term debt and subsequent changes in net debt
Average changes in net debt in the year following the double quintile sort on short-term debt, that
is, debt due within 3 years, normalized by total debt, and market leverage, that is, long-term debt
plus debt in short liabilities over book value of total liabilities plus market capitalization of equity.
Changes are measured as averages of (net debt ratio)t+1 − (net debt ratio)t as a percentage.
Short-term debt is defined as debt expiring within 3 years over total assets. Row 1-5 exhibits the
differences between changes in leverage of the average first quintile firm and that of the average fifth
quintile firm. The p-value of the corresponding t-test is given in the last row.
Short-term Market leverage (quantile)
debt (quant.) 0%–20% 20%–40% 40%–60% 60%–80% 80%–100%
1 0%–20% 1.0260 1.2082 0.6781 0.4753 2.0100
2 20%–40% 1.4422 0.6560 0.0931 -0.3104 -0.2827
3 40%–60% 0.9005 0.4733 -0.3224 -1.4850 -0.9754
4 60%–80% 0.2006 -0.0677 -0.7645 -1.5709 -1.6737
5 80%–100% -1.8954 -0.8083 -1.0250 -2.1890 -2.0350
1-5 2.9214∗∗∗ 2.0165∗∗∗ 1.7031∗∗∗ 2.6643∗∗∗ 4.0449∗∗∗
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Table 5
Short-term debt and subsequent exclusion from the data set
Fraction of firms (expressed as a percentage) exiting from the data set in the year following the sort
Short-term Market leverage (quantile)
debt (quant.) 0%–20% 20%–40% 40%–60% 60%–80% 80%–100% Avg
0%–20% 3.5480 5.0934 4.0747 4.1258 5.7082 4.3756
20%–40% 3.8419 3.8061 4.7619 4.3365 4.9500 4.2654
40%–60% 3.2196 4.5872 5.3560 4.5996 3.8217 4.3306
60%–80% 2.8832 4.3098 5.5979 5.6604 4.4761 4.6224
80%–100% 2.9155 3.4466 4.0751 5.8362 7.9730 5.6629
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The bold line plots equityholders’ optimal rollover choice from Equation (15). The
downward-sloping line illustrates the marginal response ∆D̃. With downward sloping ∆D̃,
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